Signing Unconstitutional Laws by Baude, William
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 86 | Issue 1 Article 6
Winter 2011
Signing Unconstitutional Laws
William Baude
Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, william.baude@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Baude, William (2011) "Signing Unconstitutional Laws," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 86: Iss. 1, Article 6.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol86/iss1/6
Signing Unconstitutional Laws† 
WILLIAM BAUDE* 
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 304 
I. THE RECEIVED VIEWS ........................................................................................ 306 
II. THE PRESIDENT’S POWERS AND DUTIES ............................................................ 309 
A. THE LACK OF A CATEGORICAL RULE: TEXT ....................................... 309 
B. THE LACK OF A CATEGORICAL RULE: STRUCTURE ............................. 311 
C. CONSTITUTIONAL RISKS ..................................................................... 313 
III. WHEN ARE LAWS UNCONSTITUTIONAL? ......................................................... 317 
A. “ON THE BOOKS” ................................................................................ 318 
B. THE SUBJECTS OF THE CONSTITUTION ................................................ 319 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY .................................................................. 322 
A. NIXON’S CONSTITUTIONALISM ........................................................... 323 
B. OTHER EXAMPLES .............................................................................. 325 
C. UNREDEEMABLE LAWS ....................................................................... 328 
D. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENTIALISM .............................................. 331 
CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................... 332 
 
It has become fairly common for Presidents to sign laws that they think are 
unconstitutional, at least in part. Some scholars argue that this is unconstitutional. 
Others defend it, but on pragmatic grounds, as if one cannot afford to be a 
constitutional formalist in today’s government.  
Both sides are wrong. In a wide range of cases, there is nothing wrong with 
signing unconstitutional laws. Indeed, it is required. Yet the President must 
exercise this power responsibly. He must have other constitutional duties that 
justify signing the remainder of the bill into law, and he must be prepared to use his 
other powers to prevent the unconstitutional provisions from being executed. 
President Richard Nixon’s decision to sign the Voting Rights Act of 1970 is one 
example, as are many of President George W. Bush’s maligned signing statements. 
At the same time, this conclusion need not be grounded in pragmatic disregard 
of the Constitution. Defenders of the practice wrongly treat it as a question of 
political decision making justified by constitutional necessity, and they have also 
failed to articulate adequate legal rules for when the President may sign an 
unconstitutional law. So the Constitution can be saved from the formalists: 
formalism provides a principled justification for signing unconstitutional laws and 
a legal test for when the President may do so. We are not forced to choose between 
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a President who is obligated to veto crucial legislation and one who places 
expediency over constitutional principle. 
INTRODUCTION 
Hardly anybody expects the President to stand on principle any more—or if so, 
only on the wrong ones.  
It has become fairly common for the President to sign laws that he thinks are 
unconstitutional, at least in part. While common, it is also controversial. Critics 
have argued that it is unconstitutional for the President to sign a law if he thinks it 
is even partly unconstitutional.1 And signing unconstitutional laws is defended only 
with embarrassment—as “a triumph of expediency over principle”2—or with the 
sentiment that one simply cannot afford to be a constitutional formalist in today’s 
government.3 Thus, the battle has been pitched between those who think that the 
President ought to stand on principle and veto every unconstitutional bill and those 
who think that constitutional formalism should give way to a more pragmatic or 
evolving approach to the Constitution. 
Both sides are wrong. In a wide range of cases, there is nothing wrong with 
signing unconstitutional laws. These cases involve constitutional tradeoffs between 
the President’s duties to prevent unconstitutional laws from taking effect, and his 
affirmative duties to enforce the Constitution. The President also must exercise this 
power responsibly: he must both have other constitutional duties that justify signing 
the remainder of the bill into law, and he must be prepared to use his other powers 
to prevent the unconstitutional provisions from being executed. The President 
may—indeed, must—sign unconstitutional laws in these circumstances. 
At the same time, this conclusion need not be grounded in pragmatic disregard 
of constitutional formalism. It is not up to the President to decide when 
“expediency” ought to “triumph . . . over principle.”4 Defenders of the practice are 
wrong to treat it as a question of political decision making justified by 
constitutional necessity or modern reality—or as an issue to which the Constitution 
is indifferent. Nor have they articulated adequate legal rules for when the President 
may sign an unconstitutional law. This Essay provides a principled justification for 
signing unconstitutional laws and a legal framework for when the President may do 
so. The practice is in fact controlled by constitutional law, not an exception to it. 
The argument proceeds as follows. First, as a matter of constitutional law, the 
President’s duties are more complicated than have been assumed. There is simply 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. E.g., Saikrishna Prakash, Why the President Must Veto Unconstitutional Bills, 16 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 81 (2007); Michael B. Rappaport, The President’s Veto and the 
Constitution, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 735, 766–83 (1993) [hereinafter Rappaport, Veto] (making a 
related argument); Michael B. Rappaport, The Unconstitutionality of “Signing and Not-
Enforcing,” 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 113 (2007) [hereinafter Rappaport, Signing] 
(same); infra notes 15–16. 
 2. Robert H. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1353, 1361 
(1953).  
 3. See infra note 31; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 905, 917 (1990) (acknowledging this practice without defending it). 
 4. Jackson, supra note 2, at 1361. 
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no constitutional provision, and no plausible interpretation of the President’s oath, 
that flatly forbids signing unconstitutional bills into law. Instead, there is a more 
general, overarching duty to preserve and enforce the Constitution. But the 
President has several different tools for accomplishing that overarching duty, not 
just the veto. This means that the practice is not flatly forbidden. But it does give 
rise to constitutional risks, which the President must take seriously. 
Second, the President’s broad duty to enforce the Constitution frequently 
requires him to help pass legislation—especially in the national-security and 
individual-rights contexts. When faced with legislation that will further those 
constitutional duties, the President has an obligation to pass the law, especially if a 
veto is not likely to produce an appreciably better proposal. 
The President’s duty to sign unconstitutional laws arises when these 
circumstances intersect: the President is faced with a partly unconstitutional law 
that also contains provisions that are constitutionally required. At that point, 
nothing flatly forbids him from signing the law, and there are constitutional risks 
on both sides of the decision. He must consider the tradeoffs in terms of 
constitutional consequences. Sometimes those tradeoffs will lead him to believe 
that he must sign the bill, even though part of it is unconstitutional. Several 
Presidents in recent memory have been faced with such circumstances, and this 
Essay argues that they were right to sign the unconstitutional bills. 
Part I discusses the prevailing views—absolutism on the one hand, expediency 
on the other. Part II examines the text and structure of the Constitution, and shows 
that there is no categorical duty to veto unconstitutional bills, although signing such 
a bill is not something the President may do lightly. Part III further argues that 
nothing unconstitutional happens until an unconstitutional law is enforced. Part IV 
discusses the President’s affirmative responsibilities and the tradeoffs they entail.  
Two prefatory notes are appropriate. First, methodology: this Essay assumes 
that the text and structure of the Constitution (and where known, original history) 
provide its meaning—a methodology I call “formalist.” There are no apologies for 
this, but even nonformalists should keep reading. Hardly anybody thinks that the 
text and structure of the Constitution are wholly irrelevant, so methodological 
objections should go to weight, not admissibility. Moreover, the chief advocates of 
a duty to veto are formalists,5 so the larger point of this Essay is about the 
possibilities of formalist constitutional interpretation. When formalists line up 
behind an interpretation of the Constitution that is simultaneously impractical and 
incorrect, they do formalism no favors. The Constitution can be saved from the 
formalists: we are not forced to choose between a President who is obligated to 
veto crucial legislation and abandoning formalism altogether. 
Second, perspective: this Essay analyzes signing unconstitutional laws from the 
point of view of the signer, the President. People who believe that, for example, the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act6 is unconstitutional might 
understandably be upset with the President for signing it into law. But so far as we 
know, he thought it was constitutional. My subject is the President who thinks a bill 
is unconstitutional and signs it anyway (i.e., who is alleged to have deviated from 
                                                                                                                 
 
 5. Prakash, supra note 1, at 93; Rappaport, Signing, supra note 1, at 114. 
 6. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
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his own principles).7 I shall argue that some Presidents have indeed committed such 
a deviation, but fewer than suspected or alleged. 
 I. THE RECEIVED VIEWS 
In 2007, the William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal published a symposium on 
presidential signing statements, with several articles focusing on the related 
question of whether the President may sign a law that he believes contains 
unconstitutional provisions. The most thorough treatments were critical of the 
practice. 
One author, Professor Sai Prakash, argued that “[the President] acts contrary to 
his constitutional obligations when he ushers into law bills that he regards as 
unconstitutional.”8 This is because he “violates the Constitution should he allow the 
unconstitutional bill to become law.”9 This is true even if a bill merely contains one 
potentially unconstitutional provision amidst a great many important and necessary 
ones.10 
Prakash claimed support from early executive practice, writing: “early 
Presidents shared the belief that the Constitution imposed upon them a duty to veto 
unconstitutional bills.”11 The principal examples are that President Washington 
(and later President Jefferson) thought the President was duty-bound to examine the 
constitutionality of a bill before signing it, and that Presidents Madison and Monroe 
vetoed bills on what they described as compelled constitutional grounds.12 If it is 
true that these acts all stemmed from a belief that the Constitution categorically 
forbids the President to sign unconstitutional laws,13 that is good reason to 
condemn the practice.14  
This absolutist view has broad appeal. A much-discussed American Bar 
Association task force report condemning presidential signing statements took a 
similar stance, arguing that “[t]he Founding Fathers . . . expected [the President] to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. Cf. TOM STOPPARD, THE REAL THING 75 (1984) (“You shouldn’t have done it if you 
didn’t think it was right.”). 
 8. Prakash, supra note 1, at 81–82. 
 9. Id. at 83. 
 10. Id. at 84–85. 
 11. Id. at 84. 
 12. Id. at 84–86.  
 13. It is not necessarily so. See infra text accompanying notes 182–193; cf. AKHIL REED 
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 183 (2005) (“Early practice did not go so 
far as to oblige the president to veto whenever he deemed any of a bill’s provisions 
unconstitutional.”).  
 14. Compare M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819) (grounding 
constitutional interpretation in “the practice of the government” and “[a]n exposition of the 
constitution, deliberately established by legislative acts”), with Letter from James Madison 
to N.P. Trist (Dec. 1831), in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 211 (J.B. 
Lippincott ed., 1867) (“There has been a fallacy . . . in confounding a question whether 
precedents could expound a Constitution, with a question whether they could alter a 
Constitution.”), and Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 
87 VA. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2001). See also William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1807, 1823 (2008). 
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veto even ‘urgent’ bills that he believed were unconstitutional in part.”15 Others 
have expressed a similar view.16 
Another participant in the symposium, Professor Michael Rappaport, offered a 
similar, more limited challenge. In his view, it is permissible for the President to 
sign unconstitutional laws only so long as he also intends to enforce them 
unflaggingly: Presidents have traditionally (and correctly) claimed the power and 
duty to disregard laws that they believe are unconstitutional, stemming from their 
independent ability to interpret the Constitution.17 According to Rappaport, so long 
as the President claims any such authority, he must also veto unconstitutional laws 
that come across his desk.18 The two powers are a bundled set. Under this view, 
signing unconstitutional laws is justified only when the President gives up his right 
to decide what “unconstitutional” means.  
Whether the President has independent enforcement authority or not is a topic 
that so oversaturates the journals that I will not attempt to prove everything from 
scratch. I share the increasingly conventional wisdom that the President must 
interpret the Constitution for himself, and must not enforce laws he believes violate 
it.19 And the Presidents who have signed laws they thought unconstitutional have 
not denied that they possessed independent interpretive authority, so they are all 
condemned by Rappaport’s theory. For present purposes, therefore, Rappaport’s 
critique assumes a force similar to Prakash’s.20 
Why do the absolutists think it is unconstitutional to sign unconstitutional laws? 
Two reasons. One argument is that signing unconstitutional laws is inherently 
unconstitutional. Under this view, there is something in the Constitution or the 
constitutional oath that flatly forbids the President from putting his name to 
something unconstitutional.21 The other argument is that even if it is not 
unconstitutional in and of itself, it is forbidden as a sort of reckless disregard for the 
Constitution in the future. As Rappaport puts it, “the President’s approval of a bill 
places it on the books and therefore creates the risk that it will be enforced by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS 
AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE: RECOMMENDATION 23 (Aug. 2006) [hereinafter 
ABA REPORT], available at http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements; see also id. at 1, 
19. 
 16. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 409 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (“The President, after all, is bound not to sign an improperly originated . . . 
bill by the same oath that binds us not to apply it . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); T.J. Halstead, 
Congressional Research Service, Presidential Signing Statements: Constitutional and 
Institutional Implications, at 14 (Sept. 17, 2007), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf. 
 17. Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional 
Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613 (2008). 
 18. Rappaport, Signing, supra note 1; Rappaport, Veto, supra note 1, at 766–83. 
 19. Baude, supra note 14, at 1810–11 n.13 (citing sources). 
 20. Indeed, the President’s independent power to interpret the Constitution buttresses 
my argument that he may sign unconstitutional laws. But even if one does not share that 
assumption, it does not change the basic argument, although it may alter the calculus of 
which laws he must sign. See infra Part IV.D. 
 21. Prakash, supra note 1, at 83–84. 
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executive and judicial officials who believe it is constitutional or enforceable.”22 If 
the President has any independent constitutional judgment, he must “veto the 
provision and not take the risk it will be enforced.”23 
Members of the symposium who did not condemn the practice in categorical 
terms defended it on practical grounds. For example, Professors Cass and Strauss 
argued that “[i]n a world of large, complex laws,” as a matter of “practical political 
reality,” the duty to veto is unrealistic.24 Rather, “[t]he President . . . might well 
decide that, on balance, a law is beneficial, even if he believes that one or more 
provisions violate constitutional strictures.”25 Professor Nelson Lund did briefly 
observe that “[a] President could take the plausible formalist position that an 
unconstitutional statutory provision is not a law no matter who may have purported 
to enact or approve it,”26 but then relied almost exclusively on practical conclusions 
in describing the situations in which the President might sign unconstitutional 
laws.27 Professor Lund analogized this to judicial reliance on precedent, noting 
accurately that “very few would seriously maintain that courts are always obliged 
to strike down statutes they think are unconstitutional, even in the face of 
thoroughly settled precedent.”28  
Similarly, Professor Akhil Amar has argued that the President can sign 
unconstitutional bills out of “collegiality.” He writes, 
[c]onsiderations of collegiality might even induce a president to add his 
name to a generally sound and desperately needed bill with a minor 
constitutional flaw, especially if the president deemed the constitutional 
question a close one in his own mind—much as a modern Supreme 
Court justice might sometimes join an opinion of the Court that does 
not perfectly express his individual view on certain minor points.29 
All of these arguments share a different set of common premises—that signing 
unconstitutional laws is justified not on formalist grounds, but practical ones. And 
when the authors explain the limits of the President’s power to sign 
unconstitutional laws, it is in pragmatic or practical terms30—an approach echoed 
by many others who have abandoned the hard-line view.31 (I do not mean to say 
                                                                                                                 
 
 22. Rappaport, Signing, supra note 1, at 121; see also Prakash, supra note 1, at 90–91; 
Rappaport, Veto, supra note 1, at 774. 
 23. Rappaport, Signing, supra note 1, at 121. 
 24. Ronald A. Cass & Peter L. Strauss, The Presidential Signing Statements 
Controversy, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 11, 21–22 (2007). 
 25. Id. at 22. 
 26. Nelson Lund, Presidential Signing Statements in Perspective, 16 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 95, 101 (2007). 
 27. Id. at 101–07. 
 28. Id. at 102 (emphasis in original). 
 29. AMAR, supra note 13, at 184. 
 30. E.g., Cass & Strauss, supra note 24, at 23–25. 
 31. Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive 
Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 341 (2006) (“[W]e believe that the argument . . . is 
unrealistic in an age of omnibus legislation . . . .”); Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, 
Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to Bernand N. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President 
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that “practical” or “functional” arguments cannot also be constitutional arguments. 
And of course one could also try to justify signing unconstitutional laws by some 
methodology that is neither formalist nor pragmatic.) Moreover, all of them appear 
to believe that signing unconstitutional laws is discretionary. None argue that the 
same circumstances that allow the President to sign unconstitutional laws require 
him to do so. 
All of the premises are wrong. (1) There is no “don’t-sign-unconstitutional-
bills” clause, and there is no other reason to think that signing unconstitutional laws 
is inherently unconstitutional. (2) While signing unconstitutional laws can be risky, 
the President is sometimes permitted, and even required, to take those risks. And 
(3) the considerations that go into that risk calculus can be grounded in 
constitutionally based formalism; they need not be pragmatic or functional. I 
explain why below. 
II. THE PRESIDENT’S POWERS AND DUTIES 
An examination of the text and structure of the Constitution reveals two 
principles. There is simply no provision that categorically forbids signing 
unconstitutional laws. But there are provisions that require the President to be 
careful when signing unconstitutional laws, and to do so only for good reasons. 
A. The Lack of a Categorical Rule: Text 
We should start with the Constitution itself. Nothing in the Constitution actually 
says that the President must veto unconstitutional bills. The Signing and Veto 
Clauses, the Presidential Oath Clause, and the Take Care Clause all set forth the 
President’s powers and duties in making and enforcing law, but they contain no 
categorical duty to veto.32  
Take them in turn: Article I, Section 7, explains how a bill becomes a law. After 
each house of Congress passes a bill, it is presented to the President. “If he approve 
he shall sign it,” and it becomes a law.33 “[I]f not he shall return it, with his 
Objections” and Congress is given a chance to override those objections by 
supermajority vote.34 Such disapproval of a bill is of course known as a veto,35 
although the text does not use that term. If the President neither signs nor returns 
the bill, it is deemed signed or vetoed by default, depending on whether Congress 
has adjourned.36 
                                                                                                                 
(Nov. 3, 1993), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/signing.htm; David Barron, Walter 
Dellinger, Dawn Johnson, Neil Kinkopf, Marty Lederman, Chris Schroeder, Richard 
Shiffrin, & Michael Small, Untangling the Debate on Signing Statements, Geo. Faculty L. 
Blog (July 31, 2006), http://gulcfac.typepad.com/georgetown_university_law 
/2006/07/thanks_to_the_p.html (“[E]ven if one thinks that it would be good policy for the 
President to veto all bills containing unconstitutional provisions, it will never happen.”). 
 32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; id. art. II, § 1; id. art. II, § 3. 
 33. Id. art. I, § 7. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See NOAH WEBSTER, 2 AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1st 
ed. 1828) (unpaginated).  
 36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
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The only hint that there are any constitutional rules about how the President 
exercises this function are the references to “approv[al]” and “Objections.” The text 
presupposes that the President will review a proposed bill on some normative basis 
and have some reasons for deciding not to sign it. But there is simply no provision 
for what those reasons might be. The Veto Clause tells the President what to do if 
he objects—not when to object. 
Article II, Section 3 requires the President to “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.”37 This provision does require the President to “faithfully 
execut[e]” the Constitution, which is part of “the supreme Law of the Land.”38 It is 
thus the source of the President’s duty not to enforce unconstitutional laws. But 
there is no logical reason for the President’s duty not to enforce unconstitutional 
laws to carry over to his decision whether to sign them in the first place. So long as 
an unconstitutional law is not actually executed—not treated as law by any 
government official—but merely placed, unenforceable, into the Statutes at Large, 
it is hard to see how the Take Care Clause is offended.39 
The same is true of the presidential oath: before taking office, the President must 
swear or affirm that he will “faithfully execute the Office of President of the United 
States, and will to the best of [his] Ability, preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States.”40 The faithful-execution half of the oath simply 
requires the President to execute his office. That office is defined by the 
Constitution (and perhaps by implementing statutes). If nothing else in the 
definition of the President’s office requires him to veto unconstitutional laws, then 
the faithful-execution oath does not either. 
That leaves the President’s obligation to “preserve, protect and defend.” First of 
all, it is worth noting that this oath is not absolute. It is explicitly qualified, “to the 
best of my Ability.”41 While the history or purpose of this qualification has not 
been examined much,42 it facially expresses two countervailing points: on one hand 
the President must do his best to uphold, enforce, and preserve the Constitution. He 
may not declare his actions good enough if he could be doing better. At the same 
time, perfect preservation and protection may well be impossible in the real world. 
Some constitutional problems may simply be outside of the President’s 
jurisdiction.43 Other times, the President may simply be mistaken or uncertain 
about what the Constitution demands. Or it may be impossible to avoid some 
measure of a constitutional violation because two constitutional requirements are in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 37. Id. art. II, § 3. 
 38. Id. art. VI. 
 39. For expansion of this argument, see infra Part III.A. 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 41. Id. 
 42. A rare exception is Morning Edition: Where Does the Oath of Office Come from? 
(NPR Broadcast Jan. 14, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php 
?storyId=99323353 (interview with Marvin Pinkert, Executive Director of the National 
Archives Experience); see also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 
422, 427, 575, 599 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (recording earlier drafts). 
 43. Baude, supra note 14, at 1809–11. 
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conflict.44 When perfect preservation of the Constitution is impossible, the oath 
does not demand it. 
And what do preserving, protecting, and defending require? The opposites are 
allowing something to be destroyed or damaged.45 But how does an 
unconstitutional law damage the Constitution? The Constitution, after all, is 
supreme, and preempts ordinary laws that are repugnant to it. At a practical level, 
the Constitution might not be preserved if unconstitutional laws are widely 
enforced; but the practical problem is addressed by ensuring that the 
unconstitutional law is not executed. And at a more metaphysical level, the 
Constitution takes care of itself automatically. 
B. The Lack of a Categorical Rule: Structure 
Lest that last assertion seem like mere wordplay, it can be confirmed by a deeper 
look at the Constitution’s more general structure.46 The Constitution is supreme to 
all other law. It is the instrument by which authority was delegated from the people 
to the agents who are allowed to govern them, and the agents lack power to exceed 
or transgress that delegation of authority. That supremacy is the premise of 
Marbury v. Madison’s widely accepted structural inference that “a legislative act 
contrary to the Constitution is not law,” and therefore is void.47  
Nor was that concept of voidness invented by Marbury—it had been a part of 
Anglo-American legal theory for a very long time,48 and was also a longstanding 
principle of the review of corporate authority.49 The basic principle was that laws 
that were unconstitutional were “repugnant” to the Constitution,50 and that the 
Constitution “displaced” any such unconstitutional laws to the extent of that 
repugnancy.51 That displacement is why the President must “take Care that” 
unconstitutional laws are not enforced.52 And it also explains why formalism 
imposes no categorical duty to veto—as a matter of legal authority, the fact that an 
unconstitutional law has been placed on the books is simply irrelevant. It might 
mistakenly be enforced, but there is no reason it should be.  
A corollary of this historical rule of displacement-and-repugnancy is that laws 
that are partly unconstitutional are only partly unenforceable. That is, the 
unconstitutional applications of a law are effectively severable from the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. See infra Part IV.A–B. 
 45. See WEBSTER, supra note 35 (unpaginated entries for “preserve,” “protect,” and 
“defend”). 
 46. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 802–12 (1999). 
 47. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 755–77 (2010) (discussing and defending this view). 
 48. PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 101–02, 202–08 (2008). 
 49. Mary Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502, 508–09 
(2006). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Walsh, supra note 47, at 762–66. 
 52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Baude, supra note 14, at 1810–11 & n.13; Prakash, supra 
note 1. 
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constitutional applications.53 Even in Marbury itself, the Court did not invalidate 
every section of the Judiciary Act—only the section that conferred impermissible 
jurisdiction.54 That corollary will prove critical: the times that the President may 
sign an unconstitutional law are when the law contains other provisions that are 
constitutional and crucial.55 
And what about popular legitimacy? It might seem as if the passage of 
unconstitutional laws at least casts a shadow on the Constitution’s status as widely-
recognized supreme law. But unconstitutional laws that are treated as 
unconstitutional—that are not followed and not enforced—are quite unlikely to 
have that effect, as we will shortly see at greater length.56 
The constitutional structure also provides occasion to compare the obligations of 
the different branches of government. Proponents of the absolutist view have 
argued by analogy, saying that if members of the legislature cannot vote for 
unconstitutional bills, and the judiciary cannot decide to uphold unconstitutional 
laws, the President must be absolutely forbidden to sign them.57 Similarly, Andrew 
Jackson argued that “[i]t is as much the duty of the House of Representatives, of 
the Senate, and of the President to decide upon the constitutionality of any bill or 
resolution which may be presented to them for passage or approval as it is of the 
supreme judges when it may be brought before them for judicial decision.”58 But 
that assertion pays inadequate attention to the different structural roles of each 
branch. 
The judiciary’s role differs the most. The core of the judge’s task is deciding 
cases,59 and the President’s task when presented with a bill is very different from a 
judge’s role in deciding a case. For hundreds of years, a judge’s duty in deciding a 
case has been understood as the duty to apply the law of the land to the situation 
before him.60 Judicial review is a corollary of that view of the judicial role. 
Applying the law means applying all the law, and in a system of constitutional 
supremacy, that means that the Constitution displaces any law repugnant to it. 
What about collegiality? Is it permissible for “a modern Supreme Court Justice,” 
as Akhil Amar suggests, to “sometimes join an opinion of the Court that does not 
perfectly express his individual view on certain minor points.”61 Once again, the 
answer comes from a focus on the judicial role. As I have shown in earlier work, 
the core of the judicial power is issuing judgments, not writing opinions.62 If that is 
right, and if judges are bound to apply the law as they see it, then “collegial” 
                                                                                                                 
 
 53. Walsh, supra note 47, at 762–66. 
 54. Id. at 739 (discussing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) at 176–80). 
 55. See generally infra part IV (discussing such laws and giving examples). 
 56. See infra Part III.A. 
 57. Prakash, supra note 1, at 91–92; Rappaport, Signing, supra note 1, at 117. 
 58. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), reprinted in 2 A COMPILATION OF 
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789–1897, at 567 (James D. Richardson 
ed., 1897). 
 59. Baude, supra note 14, at 1826–27. 
 60. HAMBURGER, supra note 48, at 103–16. 
 61. AMAR, supra note 13, at 144. 
 62. Baude, supra note 14, at 1844–45; see also Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of 
Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 123, 126–27 (1999). 
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compromise might indeed be justifiable on “minor points” in “an opinion of the 
Court” so long as the compromise does not actually go to the Court’s judgment 
itself. 
This is pretty much the modern practice. Surely it is common for a judge to put 
his or her name to an opinion with reasoning he or she does not entirely share. 
Under modern practice, judicial opinions are written by committee, and it is 
(understandably) considered a judicial virtue to be able to produce an opinion 
endorsed by a majority of the court. But judgments issued by multi-member 
appellate courts rarely leave room for minor compromise—the case is affirmed or 
reversed (or remanded or dismissed). And compromise over judgments is (rightly) 
extremely rare.63  
In contrast to judges, the President does not exactly apply law—constitutional or 
otherwise—when deciding whether to veto a bill. He makes law. The veto is not a 
judicial verdict about what the law requires—it is a decision about what kind of law 
to make. Furthermore, the judiciary’s involvement with a case is largely over once 
it decides the case and issues a judgment; but the President’s decision to sign a bill 
is only the first of several decisions—application and enforcement will come much 
later. So, little can be inferred from the judicial oath. 
There is a closer analogy to members of Congress.64 Like the President, they 
make law rather than applying it to concrete cases. So their obligation to support 
the Constitution might well allow them to vote for unconstitutional bills just as the 
President can sign them. But there are some important differences that may make it 
less likely for them to be justified in voting for an unconstitutional law. As we will 
see, when the President is faced with an unconstitutional bill, he has many other 
tools to protect the Constitution instead of the veto, so he can mitigate the effects of 
an unconstitutional bill.65 In contrast, members of Congress may rarely be in a 
position where they can vote for an unconstitutional bill with confidence that the 
Constitution will still be preserved—unless it is a bill that is so plainly 
unconstitutional that the President will never enforce it or the Supreme Court will 
strike it down.66 It may therefore be rarer that conscientious members of Congress 
could vote for unconstitutional bills. 
C. Constitutional Risks 
So there is no basis for a categorical duty to veto unconstitutional laws. But is 
that enough? After all, the President’s broader obligations include not only 
enforcing the laws (including the Constitution) on a case-by-case basis, but 
ensuring that the Constitution is preserved and protected. And Prakash and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. Hartnett, supra note 62, at 138–40 (discussing John M. Rogers, “I Vote This Way 
Because I’m Wrong”: The Supreme Court Justice as Epimenides, 79 KY. L.J. 439 (1991)). 
 64. For the classic exploration, see Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to 
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 65. See infra Part II.C. 
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Rappaport have argued that signing unconstitutional laws is unconstitutionally 
risky, even if it is not unconstitutional per se.67  
Now, the President has many tools besides the veto to keep unconstitutional 
laws from being enforced, even after he has signed them into law. Most crucially, 
he can refuse to enforce them and refuse to apply them in the performance of any of 
his duties.68 And this controversial power aside, the executive can make clear his 
view that the law is unconstitutional, and may well persuade courts and others to 
agree. Even if they do not agree, the President can still refuse to enforce it in future 
cases;69 if the law has criminal consequences, the President can also grant pardons 
and reprieves to mitigate those consequences.70 And if the law proves too 
dangerous, the President can also urge Congress to get rid of it71—perhaps even 
forcing Congress’s hand by threatening to veto other important legislation.72 It is a 
mistake to assume that the President’s choices are limited to “veto” or 
“wholeheartedly enforce.” 
But even with this range of tools, it is still true that signing unconstitutional laws 
is risky.73 Maybe this President will not enforce the law, but who can be sure that 
future Presidents will share the current President’s constitutional scruples?74  
Another serious risk is that judges will apply the statute even if it is 
unconstitutional. Of course if a law really is unconstitutional, judges should 
disregard it and refuse to enforce it. But the President cannot guarantee that others 
will share his enlightened views. This is the problem that Gary Lawson has called 
“stipulating the law.”75 The parties before a court cannot stop it from interpreting 
the law as it thinks best—even if they both agree on what the law says. So, for 
example, even if a criminal defendant argues that a statute is unconstitutional and 
the government prosecutor agrees, there is still a risk that the court will disagree 
with them both. 
The example is not hypothetical. Consider the fate of 18 U.S.C. § 3501, a statute 
designed by Congress to overrule Miranda v. Arizona.76 While the President 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. Prakash, supra note 1, at 90–91; Rappaport, Signing, supra note 1, at 121; see also 
Rappaport, Veto, supra note 1, at 774. 
 68. See Prakash, supra note 1. 
 69. Baude, supra note 14, at 1844–45. 
 70. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 71. Id. § 3 (“He shall from time to time . . . recommend to [Congress’s] Consideration 
such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.”); see Vasan Kesavan & J. 
Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 41–63 (2002). 
 72. Charles L. Black, Jr., Some Thoughts on the Veto, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 
95–97 (1976) (discussing how the threat of a veto enhances the President’s bargaining 
power). 
 73. I dismiss, however, the risk that “a President who believes that some statutory 
provision is void may decide that he should enforce it out of a sense that the issue should be 
resolved by the courts.” Id. at 90. If he really thinks it unconstitutional, he should not do that. 
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analysis or Prakash’s. 
 74. See Prakash, supra note 1, at 90. 
 75. Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) 
(manuscript at 27–31), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1677014. 
 76. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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repeatedly attempted to keep the judiciary from applying the statute,77 the executive 
branch could not help but bring prosecutions to which § 3501 was relevant. And in 
such cases, the President could not stop the judiciary from deciding for itself 
whether the statute applied.78 On that basis, one court of appeals ultimately applied 
the statute and overruled Miranda, although the decision was ultimately overruled 
by the Supreme Court.79 Miranda survived, but, for its supporters, the episode 
illustrates the riskiness of letting an unconstitutional statute creep onto the statute 
books. 
To be sure, courts do sometimes refuse to decide constitutional questions when 
the parties agree on the answer, and thus let the parties “stipulate the law.”80 And 
Lawson argues that the courts might well be right to do so.81 But as he 
acknowledges, stipulating the law is not the norm.82 The President therefore must 
bear in mind the risk that a court will disagree with his judgment of 
unconstitutionality. 
For some statutes, the President’s refusal to enforce them will ensure that a court 
never has the opportunity to hold them constitutional. For example, there can be no 
criminal prosecution unless the executive branch decides to bring one,83 so a statute 
that unconstitutionally creates a crime generally cannot be enforced without its 
consent. But for other statutes (as with § 3501 above) the President cannot entirely 
stop them from surfacing in otherwise valid prosecutions. Moreover, the United 
States will not always even be a party to a case that involves an unconstitutional 
law—such as a civil lawsuit between two private parties or a lawsuit involving a 
state. The United States does have the statutory right to be notified of and intervene 
in any federal case “wherein the constitutionally of any Act of Congress affecting 
the public interest is drawn in question.”84 But that statute is frequently forgotten by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. See Paul Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the 
Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 175, 203–22 (1999). 
 78. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 464–65 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The 
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 80. Lawson, supra note 75, at 29–30. 
 81. Id. at 41–43. 
 82. Id. at 31. 
 83. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 170–72 (5th Cir. 1965); id. at 190–96 
(Wisdom, J., concurring specially); Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454, 457 (1868); cf. 
Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, 130 S. Ct. 2184, 2187–89 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., 
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 84. 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (2006). 
316 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:303 
 
courts and parties,85 and it does not apply if neither party “draw[s] in question” the 
law’s constitutionality.86 
Another risk is that there may only be limited remedies if officers mistakenly 
enforce the unconstitutional law. Under modern doctrine, one of the chief remedies 
for a constitutional violation by a government officer is the right to sue that officer 
for violating the Constitution.87 But any monetary recovery against that officer can 
be blocked by the doctrine of qualified immunity. And courts regularly award 
qualified immunity to officers sued for enforcing a potentially unconstitutional 
statute so long as a court has not yet said that it is unconstitutional.88 
At least one court has carried that presumption even further. Consider the 
Second Circuit’s recent decision in Amore v. Novarro.89 There, a police officer 
arrested Mr. Amore for violating a loitering statute that had been held 
unconstitutional eighteen years earlier.90 Even though the unconstitutionality of the 
statute was therefore “clearly established” by judicial decision, the court of appeals 
still concluded that the officer could not be sued for damages, because he had relied 
on the statute “on the books.”91  
Amore may prove to be an aberration. After the Court’s initial decision, the state 
of New York finally repealed the unconstitutional statute (perhaps because of 
another pending lawsuit where the state had been held in contempt of court for 
leaving the statute on the books).92 And as the court eventually acknowledged, 
other circuits had not awarded qualified immunity when the law on the books had 
clearly been established as unconstitutional.93 But even after receiving a petition for 
rehearing and an amicus brief from civil rights groups, the panel continued to 
defend its original ruling.94 (It also attempted, with debatable success, to distinguish 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. See, e.g., Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson v. Pope, 516 F.3d 1214, 1215–16 (10th Cir. 
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2011] SIGNING UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAWS 317 
 
the myriad cases to the contrary.)95 If the Amore doctrine becomes widespread, 
signing unconstitutional statutes could shield other executive actors from 
responsibility for plainly unconstitutional conduct. And even if it does not, it 
illustrates the danger of depending on courts to safeguard constitutional rights.96 
So by signing an unconstitutional law, the President does create a risk of future 
violations of the Constitution. And were that the only consideration, Rappaport and 
Prakash might well be correct in urging the President to err on the side of caution 
by vetoing unconstitutional bills.97 But it is not. In many cases, bills deal with more 
than one subject, contain some provisions that are constitutional and some that are 
potentially not, and therefore pose tradeoffs. In many cases, those tradeoffs allow 
the President to sign the bill. 
When the only positive tradeoffs that come from a bill are purely matters of 
policy, the risks that come from signing an unconstitutional law are hard to justify 
under the President’s oath—just as a trustee who takes an oath to protect a group of 
children could not place them in harm’s way in exchange for a large sum of money, 
whether given to him or donated to his favorite charity.98 
On the other hand, in many cases—far more than are commonly appreciated—
there are constitutional obligations on both sides of the equation. That is, the 
President is presented with bills that he has some amount of constitutional 
obligation to see enacted, so there are constitutional values on both sides of the bill. 
He need not, and cannot, adopt a stance of pure risk aversion. Part IV will explore 
those circumstances and discuss when the President may and must sign 
unconstitutional bills. 
III. WHEN ARE LAWS UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 
One premise of the foregoing analysis of the President’s role is that the critical 
moment is when an unconstitutional law is executed—that what matters is whether 
the Constitution is actually enforced in practice (and therefore whether 
unconstitutional laws are in practice disregarded). That premise derives both from 
the Take Care Clause (which is concerned with “execution”) and the presidential 
oath. But because that premise is critical, it is worth defending in further detail. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 95. Id. at *23–25. 
 96. A truly responsible executive would have taken greater measures to ensure that the 
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A. “On the Books” 
As we have seen, there is some risk that an unconstitutional law “on the books” 
might eventually be enforced, but that is a risk that the President can mitigate. 
Some skeptics might go further: even if the President ensures that nothing 
unconstitutional ever actually happens, isn’t it still a problem for him to let an 
unconstitutional law be put “on the books” when he could stop it?  
The answer is no. To be sure, notice is important. By long tradition99—and 
perhaps constitutional right100—the law is published. This allows people to know 
what they are expected to do. But the Statutes at Large and the U.S. Code do not 
have constitutional status. Indeed, those “books” are full of statutes that are widely 
known to be partly or wholly unconstitutional.  
For example, Congress did not repeal the federal ban on flag burning after it was 
struck down in United States v. Eichman,101 and it still sits in the U.S. Code.102 
United States v. Booker103 held that the mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
were unconstitutional, but the text of Title 18 still purports to make them so.104 
There is no reason to think that Congress has been acting unconstitutionally in 
failing to repeal such statutes once the Supreme Court holds them unconstitutional.  
Indeed, if there were some constitutional problem with allowing an 
unconstitutional law to sit, unenforceable, “on the books,” the President would 
presumably be required to try to have them all repealed. So far as I know, nobody 
believes that he is obligated to attempt this feat. And with good reason. 
The laws written in those books are all understood to be subject to judicial and 
presidential review. Imagine that every law passed by Congress included a footnote 
saying, “this statute does not apply in any circumstances in which it would be 
unconstitutional for it to apply.” Surely, signing such a law could not be 
unconstitutional. As written, the law is constitutional by definition!105 
But reality is not much different. Congress does not bother including such a 
footnote when it passes legislation, because it literally goes without saying. Just as 
if that footnote were included, every statute “on the books” is effectively limited by 
the Constitution, and everybody knows it. That is a direct consequence of 
constitutional supremacy.106  
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By signing an unconstitutional law and putting it “on the books,” the President 
is not concluding that it will always be constitutional in every application; he is just 
putting the constitutional questions aside for a future day.107 So nobody should 
infer too much from a law’s presence “on the books.” 
And if notice is the constitutional problem, the veto is not the solution. When a 
President signs a partly unconstitutional law, he can make his own constitutional 
views known through a signing statement. That way, nobody misinterprets his 
approval of the bill as a whole with an approval of every piece of it. This will 
discourage others (especially within the executive branch) from trying to enforce it, 
and give fairer warning to those who wish to know the law.108 That is why so many 
scholars ultimately came out in favor of signing statements (at least in principle), 
calling them “a good thing.”109 As they explained,  
“[i]f the President has decided to decline to enforce a statute because 
it’s unconstitutional . . . then it is much better that he tell the Congress 
and the public of his intentions, rather than keep it secret, because in 
that case the checks and balances of the constitutional system can be set 
to work.”110 
Similarly, signing statements serve to counter any symbolic objections to 
placing an unconstitutional law on the books. Imagine the President signs a bill 
while simultaneously saying, “now, to be clear, Chapter Two of this law is 
unconstitutional, and I am signing it only because I am confident that I and my 
successors will never enforce it, and the courts would disregard it in the unlikely 
event that it was enforced. Moreover, I am only willing to take the risk of placing it 
on the books because Chapter One does something very important—indeed, it 
helps me fulfill some of my other constitutional duties.” It is hard to see what harm 
(other than the risk that it will be improperly enforced) could come from placing an 
unenforceable law on the books under such circumstances. 
B. The Subjects of the Constitution 
One other potential objection emerges from a very recent article by Professor 
Nicholas Rosenkranz. Rosenkranz argues that in many cases the Constitution is 
violated at the very moment Congress passes a law, regardless of whether that law 
is ever executed (or executed improperly) by the President.111 He does not directly 
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address the topic dealt with here—whether the President is therefore obligated to 
veto those laws and so prevent the constitutional violation from occurring. But if 
correct, his analysis has important implications for mine. If a constitutional 
violation occurs at the moment Congress passes a law, the President’s other tools 
(like nonenforcement, pardon, and publicity) cannot make up for his failure to 
veto—it would be too late to fix the constitutional error. 
According to Rosenkranz, any time Congress violates the Constitution, it does 
so at the moment it passes the unconstitutional law.112 He further argues that a large 
number of potential constitutional violations (including all violations of the First 
Amendment and all laws in excess of Congress’s enumerated powers) are such 
congressional violations.113 More of Professor Rosenkranz’s work on this subject is 
still forthcoming,114 so a full critique of his theory may be premature. But on the 
basis of what he has published so far, I have my doubts.  
First, take the assertion that, “as a matter of simple temporal logic,” if Congress 
has violated the Constitution, “it must be that the moment of violation was when 
Congress made the law.”115 Rosenkranz acknowledges that “after the law is made, 
it may go on to have pernicious effects—particularly when it is executed,”116 but he 
points out that the original legislators may be gone from Congress: “[i]t makes no 
sense to say that they violated their oaths and violated the Constitution at the 
moment of enforcement, from their beds, or their graves.”117 
Yet it is not so nonsensical. Rosenkranz earlier analogizes constitutional 
violations to violations of the criminal law,118 and the analogy is revealing. There 
are plenty of acts whose criminality turns on their subsequent effects. For example, 
it is a federal crime to commit assault (in certain jurisdictions) “resulting in serious 
bodily injury.”119 How serious the resulting injuries are depends on events that 
occur after the assault itself—on how long the victim bleeds, when she receives 
medical attention, and so on.120 
Similarly, as the Supreme Court recognized long ago in Diaz v. United States, a 
person has not committed murder until the victim dies of his wounds, even if that 
death is long after he is battered by his attacker.121 The same is true under the 
common law.122 In other words, there is no rule that a violation of the criminal law 
can only be committed at the moment the defendant acts. It is not at all apparent 
why a statutory violation of the Constitution must be different. 
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Consider the Free Speech Clause, which Rosenkranz examines at length. We 
know that a law violates that clause when it “abridg[es]” the freedom of speech.123 
Imagine a law that clearly purports to prohibit protected speech, and which (the 
President explains) therefore cannot be applied to certain conduct and accordingly 
will not be enforced. Imagine further that nobody is punished for their protected 
speech and (thanks to the President’s promises not to enforce it) that nobody is 
deterred from speaking. Surely nobody’s freedom has been abridged124 and no 
constitutional violation has occurred. In contrast, if another President eventually 
takes office and decides to enforce the statute, then the freedom of speech will be 
abridged for the first time, and the law will be unconstitutional for the first time. 
Just like “assault resulting in serious bodily injury,” a law “abridging the freedom 
of speech” must be judged by the ill effects it has—that is, by whether any freedom 
is actually abridged by the law. 
And even if Rosenkranz were correct that constitutional prohibitions addressed 
directly to Congress can be violated only at the moment of enactment, I am dubious 
of his further claim that laws exceeding Congress’s enumerated powers have such 
characteristics.125 The First Amendment says that “Congress shall make no law” 
violating its dictates.126 But as Rosenkranz acknowledges, this is not true of the 
enumerated powers, which are “grant[s] of power rather than . . . restriction[s] on 
power, so, strictly speaking . . . cannot be ‘violated’ at all.”127 
Rosenkranz goes on to argue that when Congress “exceed[s] its power under the 
Commerce Clause,” it “violate[s] the Tenth Amendment.”128 But the Tenth 
Amendment, unlike the First, is not addressed to any branch of government in 
particular. It simply says that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”129 If Congress passes a law that would exceed its 
powers, but the law is never enforced, how has it offended the States’ 
“reserv[ation]” of power? And if such a law is enforced, why is it the passage of the 
law, rather than its enforcement, that is the constitutional problem? Rosenkranz’s 
thesis is not proven.130 
And in the end, the implications for my analysis are just a matter of scope. If I 
am wrong on this issue, it will go to which unconstitutional laws the President may 
sign, not whether there are any. By contrast, even if I am right about the flaws in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 123. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 124. Even somebody who is not Holmes’s “bad man,” and therefore feels a moral 
obligation to obey the law, O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459–
61 (1897), ought to feel no obligation to obey a law that he knows and has been told is 
unconstitutional. 
 125. Rosenkranz, supra note 111, at 1273–88; see also infra Part IV.A (discussing and 
defending President Nixon’s decision to sign such a law). 
 126. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 127. Rosenkranz, supra note 111, at 1275. 
 128. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 129. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 130. In many respects, Rosenkranz’s thesis also appears to be inconsistent with the 
treatment of the severability issue in the early days of the Republic. See generally Walsh, 
supra note 47, at 755–77; see also supra notes 48–55 and accompanying text. 
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Rosenkranz’s analysis of the Free Speech Clause and the enumerated powers, there 
might be some constitutional violations that could be consummated by passage of a 
law alone—perhaps a bill granting a title of nobility, or one purporting to establish, 
purely symbolically, an official religion.131 If such laws exist, I do not argue that 
the President is justified in signing them. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
So the President may sign unconstitutional bills in theory, but may not do so 
lightly. By allowing a bill to comply with the Constitution’s procedural 
requirements for becoming law—even if it does not comply with the Constitution’s 
substantive requirements—the President does increase the risk that it will be 
applied to produce unconstitutional results in the future. If not by him, perhaps by a 
successor, by a subordinate, by a court. While nothing flatly forbids the President 
from taking such risks, the President’s constitutional oaths surely do not allow him 
to court those risks needlessly. 
Yet weighty constitutional concerns can justify the risky (but constitutional) 
practice of signing a bill that contains some unconstitutional provisions. There are 
many situations where the President is constitutionally required to pass a law that is 
partly unconstitutional.  
Our Constitution is mostly a charter of structural rules and negative liberties.132 
It generally forbids the government from doing things but does not require it to take 
affirmative action. But there are important exceptions to that general rule, and it is a 
mistake to assume that the government never has a constitutional obligation to 
improve the status quo.133 More often than is widely appreciated, the Constitution 
does require the government to take action. In such cases, signing a new bill may 
be the best realistic way to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution, even if 
that bill also has potentially unconstitutional applications. This is not the same 
thing as suggesting that it is okay to violate the Constitution in times of great 
necessity. Remember, there is no “don’t-sign-unconstitutional-bills” clause, so 
signing an unconstitutional bill does not violate the Constitution per se. The point 
of this analysis is to explain why a sensible President would ever have a 
constitutional reason to sign an unconstitutional bill, especially in light of the 
constitutional risks entailed by doing so. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 131. Contra U.S. CONST. art. I., § 9; id. amend. I. Thanks to Stephen Sachs for this 
observation. 
 132. David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
864, 886 (1986) (concluding that generally “the Constitution is a charter of negative rather 
than positive liberties” (quoting Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 
1983) (Posner, J.))). 
 133. I discuss important examples infra Part IV.A–B; see also Currie, supra note 132, at 
872–76 (canvassing exceptions). But I am sure this discussion raises more questions than it 
answers. A more exhaustive defense of the government’s constitutional obligations to 
legislate, and an attempt to reconcile that accounting with the fundamental principles of 
limited government and private ordering, must await a future work. 
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A. Nixon’s Constitutionalism 
An example may help. Consider President Richard Nixon’s decision to renew 
the Voting Rights Act in 1970. The Voting Rights Act of 1965134 was enacted in 
response to a long campaign by the Southern states to evade the Fifteenth 
Amendment’s requirement that voting rights not be abridged on account of race.135 
The Act radically restricted states’ abilities to establish literacy tests and the like, 
and it established an administrative pre-clearance scheme to forbid some 
jurisdictions from concocting new measures without prior approval by the 
Department of Justice or a federal district court.136 In short, the Act was designed to 
eliminate what Congress believed to be widespread violations of the Constitution. 
By 1970, there was evidence that the Act was doing just that,137 but some 
provisions of the Act would soon effectively expire.138 There was also reason to 
worry that the constitutional problems would recur if these portions were not 
renewed. Jurisdictions formerly covered by Section Five would be freed to go back 
to their old ways, or to invent new ones accomplishing the same evil ends. As the 
Court has observed, “the States were creative in ‘contriving new rules’ to continue 
violating the Fifteenth Amendment” even “‘in the face of adverse federal court 
decrees.’”139  
So Congress extended the old Act by passing the Voting Rights Act of 1970 and 
presented it to President Nixon.140 As long as the Act was an “appropriate” 
provision to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment’s voting rights,141 failing to extend it 
would itself be a constitutional problem—thousands and thousands of voters would 
have their constitutional rights violated without it. A President bound to take care 
that these rights be protected could hardly ignore this when contemplating the bill 
on his desk. 
However, the new Act also contained a provision lowering the minimum voting 
age from twenty-one years old to eighteen.142 The provision applied not only in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 134. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965). 
 135. See Nw. Austin Municipality Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2508–09 
(2009); see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310–11 (1966); ALEXANDER 
KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 105–11 (2000). 
 136. Voting Rights Act of 1965 (discussed in Nw. Austin, 120 S. Ct. at 2509–10). 
 137. See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1784–85 
n.151 (2007). 
 138. See Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2510 (“As enacted, [sections] 4 and 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act were temporary provisions. They were expected to be in effect for only five 
years.”). The Act did not have an explicit sunset provision, but it banned literacy tests and 
then terminated coverage after they had been gone for five years. Voting Rights Act of 1965 
§ 4(a). 
 139. Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2508–09 (quoting Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 335). 
 140. See Act of June 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (extending the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965). For a summary see ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 31–42 (1987). 
 141. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. 
 142. § 302, 84 Stat. at 318; see also Jenny Diamond Cheng, Uncovering the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment, 18–24 (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file 
with University of Michigan Library), available at http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu (detailing 
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congressional elections, where it could arguably be justified under Congress’s 
Article I authority,143 but to all state elections as well. Such a dramatic revision of 
state election law could not be justified under any of Congress’s powers. 
President Nixon recognized this. Calling the voting-age provision “an 
unconstitutional assertion of Congressional authority in an area specifically 
reserved to the States,” he had contacted House leadership after the Senate 
appended it to the Voting Rights Act of 1970.144 He had urged the House to 
eliminate it and to pass a constitutional amendment instead: although Nixon 
“strongly favor[ed] the 18-year-old vote,”145 he thought that its inclusion rendered 
the bill partly unconstitutional. It also risked creating a crisis during the 1972 
election, and damaging the credibility of Congress’s Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendment legislation in the eyes of the Court.146 These objections were to no 
avail. 
So when the Voting Rights Act of 1970 was passed by Congress, it contained a 
number of provisions enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, and a voting-age 
provision that exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers. With no line-item veto, the 
President had to either sign it into law and thus put his name to a provision that he 
thought violated the Constitution, or veto it and thus permit violations of the 
constitutional rights of thousands of black voters. 
The text and constitutional structure supply the framework for analyzing the 
problem, but not an obvious answer to this dilemma. The Constitution tells the 
President that he must preserve the Constitution as best he can—it does not tell him 
how to triage when he cannot do so perfectly. That is a matter that has to be 
committed to his judgment about the best use of his constitutional powers. Nixon 
chose to sign the Act rather than veto it147—a difficult choice given the concerns he 
had outlined in his letter to the House, but in hindsight the right one. The Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
legislative history of this provision). 
 143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 144. Letter to House Leaders Supporting a Constitutional Amendment to Lower the 
Voting Age, 1970 PUB. PAPERS 401, 401 (Apr. 27, 1970). “The President was supported in 
this view by the testimony of two senior Department of Justice officials—Deputy Attorney 
General Richard Kleindienst and Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist.” Seth P. 
Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1081 n.33 (2001). 
 145. Letter to House Leaders Supporting a Constitutional Amendment to Lower the 
Voting Age, 1970 PUB. PAPERS 401, 401 (Apr. 27, 1970); see also Cheng, supra note 142, at 
63. 
 146. Letter to House Leaders Supporting a Constitutional Amendment to Lower the 
Voting Age, 1970 PUB. PAPERS 401, 402–04 (Apr. 27, 1970); see also Cheng, supra note 
142, at 20 (“If the votes of 18-year-old citizens were disregarded as invalid, an election 
might be thrown into the House of Representatives. This uncertainty and confusion would 
arise at the very time when the Nation can ill afford to await the outcome of protracted 
litigation, and even worse, be divided by it.” (quoting Voting Rights Act Amendments of 
1969, 116 CONG. REC. 6877, 6947 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska))). But see JOSH 
CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS 
IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 162–92 (2007) (defending legislative 
privilege of resolving disputed elections). 
 147. Presidential Statement on Signing the Voting Rights Act of 1970, 1970 PUB. PAPERS 
512 (June 22, 1970). 
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Court struck down the unconstitutional part of the statute,148 and the next year a 
constitutional amendment solved the problem permanently.149 All of this was 
accomplished without sacrificing constitutional rights of black voters. President 
Nixon is an unlikely exemplar of presidential constitutionalism, but this time he 
nailed it. 
B. Other Examples 
It would be a mistake to dismiss this example as an oddity. The President has 
other important affirmative obligations to preserve and enforce the Constitution. 
These can also justify signing unconstitutional bills.  
For example, the federal government must “guarantee to every State . . . a 
Republican Form of Government and . . . protect each of them against Invasion.”150 
This obligation is positive, not merely negative; it is not enough for the President to 
refrain from overthrowing state governments or invading the states himself.151 The 
Constitution requires him to protect against invasions by others, and to ensure that 
their republican governments remain intact. So when the President believes that a 
measure is necessary to win a war in which American territory is threatened, he not 
only believes that measure is wise, he also believes that it is required by his 
constitutional obligations to “protect” the states “against Invasion.”152 
This suggests that when Congress passes an important national security153 
measure that contains a few provisions that are potentially unconstitutional, the 
President can be justified in signing it. If he signs the law, an unconstitutional 
provision might be enforced in the future. If not, an invasion might succeed or a 
republican government might be overthrown. It is hard to lay out a complete 
calculus of these constitutional risks,154 but it is implausible that the President is 
always required to risk an unconstitutional invasion by vetoing a bill with an 
unconstitutional provision. 
The portion of the recent signing statements controversy that condemned 
President George W. Bush for signing laws he viewed as unconstitutional155 can be 
assessed in this light; for example, in late 2001, the President signed an intelligence 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). The Solicitor General informed the Court 
that the President thought the statute was unconstitutional, while also providing an argument 
for upholding the statute. Waxman, supra note 144, at 1081–82. 
 149. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. 
 150. Id. art. IV, § 4; see also Currie, supra note 132, at 865 (noting that this is an 
affirmative obligation). 
 151. See, e.g., 113 CONG. REC. 32959, 32961 (Nov. 19, 1987) (statement of Rep. 
Conyers) (“[W]e not only have the power to act, we have the duty to act. The Constitution 
does not say we ‘may.’ It says that we ‘shall’ guarantee to every state a republican form of 
government.”). See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 225–26 (James Madison) (George 
W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001). 
 152. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 153. I use the phrase “national security” in the technical sense of a law helping to prevent 
invasions or to protect republican governments. 
 154. See infra Part IV.D (discussing some of the parameters). 
 155. See, e.g., ABA REPORT, supra note 15, at 15–18. 
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appropriations bill.156 He explained that it “authorize[d] appropriations to fund 
United States intelligence activities, including activities essential to success in the 
war against global terrorism.”157 At the same time, one provision required the 
executive to report intelligence matters to Congress more extensively than he 
thought proper.158 According to the President, this requirement “in some 
circumstances, would fall short of constitutional standards,” and therefore would 
not be applied.159 By signing the bill while planning to disregard this provision, the 
President concluded that his duty to protect the country against invasion 
outweighed the small danger of allowing the potentially unconstitutional reporting 
requirement to sit ignored in the Statutes at Large. 
Similarly, the President signed a three hundred billion dollar appropriations bill 
that he said would “provide[] the resources needed to continue the war against 
global terrorism, [and] pursue an effective missile defense,”160 but that also 
imposed some potentially unconstitutional restrictions, such as notification 
requirements.161 Another appropriations bill provided “essential funding to support 
America’s war on terrorism” and allowed the President “to meet the diplomatic 
requirements stemming from the September 11th attacks,”162 but also “purport[ed]” 
to “interfere with the President’s constitutional authority to conduct the Nation’s 
foreign affairs.”163 This pattern recurred throughout many of the unconstitutional 
laws he signed.164 
One can dispute the President’s judgment in these cases. Perhaps the provisions 
were not really unconstitutional, or perhaps the constitutional needs for these 
                                                                                                                 
 
 156. Presidential Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2002, 37 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1834 (Dec. 28, 2001). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-108, § 
305, 115 Stat. 1394, 1398–99 (2001). 
 159. Presidential Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2002, 37 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1834 (Dec. 28, 2001). 
 160. Presidential Statement on Signing the Department of Defense and Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the 
United States Act, 2002, 38 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 46 (Jan. 10, 2002). 
 161. See id. at 47–48. 
 162. Presidential Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and 
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 38 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 49 (Jan. 10, 2002). 
 163. Id. at 50. 
 164. See, e.g., Presidential Statement on Signing the Department of Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act, 2007, 42 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1742 (Oct. 4, 2006); Presidential 
Statement on Signing the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for 
the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 39 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1549 (Nov. 6, 
2003); Presidential Statement on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 
2003, 38 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1834 (Oct. 23, 2002); Presidential Statement on Signing 
the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, 38 WKLY. COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 822 (May 14, 2002). In some cases, the President may have chosen to “construe” the 
problematic provisions in a special way, rather than to disregard them. Presidential Signing 
Statement Hearing, supra note 108, at 2–6 (statement of Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz). I do 
not regard the difference as material. 
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security measures were not as serious as he said.165 But my point is that his 
arguments were correct in form, and if his premises were correct, he acted properly 
in signing the laws even though he thought them unconstitutional. The 
unconstitutional provisions that he signed largely affected the executive branch 
directly, and would not be enforced against the President’s wishes without a 
concerted effort by other branches. In contrast, not signing those laws (he believed) 
would have jeopardized the military’s ability to defend our borders as the 
Constitution requires. 
Judgments of this sort are not new either. Consider Andrew Johnson’s decision 
to sign the 1867 Army Appropriations Act166 despite believing that it “deprive[d] 
the President of his constitutional functions as Commander in Chief” and “denie[d] 
to ten States . . . their constitutional right to protect themselves.”167 He felt that the 
bill contained “necessary appropriations” which he would be “compelled to defeat” 
if he vetoed it.168 Johnson therefore signed it despite the constitutional problems 
and used his other executive powers to mitigate the parts he thought 
unconstitutional.169 
That is not all. Beyond the duty to protect the country, the Constitution’s 
amendments are teeming with individual rights that the federal government has the 
power to protect—such as the Fourteenth Amendment (and the Bill of Rights it 
incorporates),170 and four voting rights amendments.171 That power to protect 
implies responsibility: the Constitution obligates the President to take care that the 
Constitution is faithfully enforced, and to actively preserve and protect the 
Constitution. The President is thus obligated to take care that those rights-
protecting provisions are enforced by protecting the people’s constitutional 
rights.172  
                                                                                                                 
 
 165. For example, some have claimed that the threat to America’s borders was not as 
strong as the Executive Branch appeared to believe. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: 
FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 554–
55 (2004). But see Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2276–77 (2008) (“[N]either the 
Members of this Court nor most federal judges begin the day with briefings that may 
describe new and serious threats to our Nation and its people.”); JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE 
TERROR PRESIDENCY 71–72 (2007). 
 166. Army Appropriations Act, ch. 170, 14 Stat. 485 (1867).  
 167. Andrew Johnson, Protest to the House of Representatives (Mar. 2, 1867), reprinted 
in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 58, at 
472. 
 168. Id. The necessity was unexplained. 
 169. See Josh Chafetz, Impeachment and Assassination, 95 MINN. L. REV. 347, 404–05 
(forthcoming 2010). 
 170. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; On incorporation, see AMAR, supra note 13, at 386–90; 
Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I: “Privileges and 
Immunities” as an Antebellum Term of Art, 99 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 
57), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1561183; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 
3020, 3058 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 171. U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. 
 172. To be sure, it is very rare for courts to find a constitutional violation in the 
government’s failure to act. See generally Currie, supra note 132. But the very premise of 
presidential responsibility is that the President is guided by principles even if courts will not 
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The extent of this obligation of course depends on how broadly the Fourteenth 
Amendment sweeps. Some scholars argue that the Amendment obligates the 
federal government to guarantee a right to education,173 or a broad set of welfare 
rights.174 The correctness of such interpretations determines the extent of the 
President’s authorization and obligation to enforce those rights (and to sign 
unconstitutional laws if necessary to do so). But even under a narrower conception, 
the President surely must act to guarantee the equal protection of the laws or (as 
Nixon did) the equal right to vote.175 
C. Unredeemable Laws 
Of course, sometimes there is no good reason to sign an unconstitutional bill. 
For one example, there was little justification for President Bush’s decision to sign 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, which limited the freedom to contribute to 
political parties or to run certain political advertisements too close to an election.176 
Acknowledging that the Act “present[ed] serious constitutional concerns” under the 
First Amendment, the President nonetheless decided to sign it and leave the mess to 
the courts to sort out.177 (Ironically, the Supreme Court then deferred to the 
constitutional judgment of the political branches, leaving the freedom of speech 
thoroughly abridged for many.)178  
President Bush did not suggest that a countervailing constitutional obligation 
justified taking this risk. Even those who think Congress should more aggressively 
regulate private spending in elections do not usually suggest that private spending 
is constitutionally problematic, nor did he.179 And while the President did praise the 
                                                                                                                 
force him to be. 
 173. Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 
367–99 (2006); cf. Presidential Statement on Signing the Departments of Labor, Health and 
Human Services, and Education and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, 38 WKLY. 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 50 (Jan. 10, 2002) (signing educational bill with unconstitutional 
provisions). 
 174. See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of 
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). 
 175. These examples are not exhaustive. Another is President Lincoln’s belief that he had 
a “constitutional duty” to preserve the Union by fighting the Civil War. Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 691, 706–07 
(2004) (book review) (emphasis omitted). 
 176. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 [hereinafter BCRA], Pub. L. No. 107-
155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002). 
 177. Presidential Statement on Signing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 38 
WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 518 (Mar. 27, 2002), available at  
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020327.html. 
 178. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003), overruled in part by 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), reaff’d in part by 
Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 3544 (2010). 
 179. There is no evidence that the President disagreed with the conventional wisdom that 
neither the First Amendment nor the Equal Protection Clause limits private action. See 
generally Lloyd v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 
(1883); Lillian Riemer BeVier & John C. Harrison, The State Action Principle and Its 
Critics, 96 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1588082. 
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decision to raise the individual contribution limit, he did not suggest that the new 
limits were of such overriding constitutional importance as to justify the other 
unconstitutional provisions.180 So if the President took seriously his duty to 
preserve the people’s rights to freedom of speech and thought that the Act was 
constitutionally problematic, he should have vetoed it.181 Signing it was a 
dereliction of constitutional duty. 
The same is true of the historical examples given by Professor Prakash.182 
Consider Madison’s veto of internal improvements legislation and Monroe’s veto 
of the Cumberland Road.183 The entire bills were challenged as exceeding the 
federal government’s enumerated powers. There were no permissible pieces that 
might be constitutionally justified, and there was no presidential duty to justify 
passing the bill either—no threatened invasion of the states and no constitutional 
rights at stake. So the episode did not have the characteristics that justify signing 
unconstitutional laws; no other method of presidential review would be better than 
a veto, and there was no presidential duty that would justify signing the bill if it 
was partly unconstitutional. The Presidents were right to feel obligated to veto 
these bills.184 
This is even more true of President Washington. When confronted with the 
fateful proposal to create a national bank, Washington wrote that it was his “duty to 
examine” the constitutional objections to the institution before proceeding.185 Of 
course, Washington concluded that the bill was constitutional and signed it. But 
                                                                                                                 
 
 180. Presidential Statement on Signing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 38 
WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 517 (Mar. 27, 2002), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020327.html; see also id. at 518 (“This 
legislation . . . does represent progress . . . [and] improves the current system of financing for 
Federal campaigns . . . .”). 
 181. Of course, depending on which provisions of the Act the President thought 
unconstitutional, it is possible that his faith in the courts may eventually be vindicated. See 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010); SpeechNow.org v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Emily’s List v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 581 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2009). But see Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 698 F. Supp. 2d 150, 153 (2010), summarily aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 3544. But even what 
vindication has come has been slow. Contra BCRA § 403(a)(4), 116 Stat. 81 at 113–14 
(requiring courts “to expedite to the greatest possible extent” challenges to the BCRA). 
 182. Prakash, supra note 1, at 84–86. 
 183. See James Madison, Veto Message (Mar. 3, 1817), reprinted in 2 A COMPILATION OF 
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 58, at 569; James Monroe, Veto 
Message (Mar. 4, 1822), reprinted in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF 
THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 58, at 142; Prakash, supra note 1, at 84–86. For more 
background, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 
1801–1829, at 260–66 (2001) (discussing the internal improvements veto); id. at 279–81 
(discussing Cumberland Road). 
 184. That is, assuming that their constitutional objections were accurate. But see, e.g., 
CURRIE, supra note 183, at 278, 280–81 (questioning Monroe’s objections to the 
Cumberland Road bill). 
 185. Prakash, supra note 1, at 84 (quoting Letter from George Washington to Alexander 
Hamilton (Feb. 16, 1791), in 31 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 215 (John C. 
Fitzpatrick ed., 1939)). 
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“[a]rguably,” Professor Prakash suggests, “there would be little point in 
Washington conducting an extensive consideration of the constitutional question if 
he did not believe that he had to veto the bill if he ultimately concluded that it was 
unconstitutional.”186 He draws a similar inference from the response of 
Washington’s advisors: “the very fact that all three opinions Washington received . 
. . only considered the constitutionality of the bank perhaps suggests that these 
gentlemen understood that Washington had no choice if he found the bank 
unconstitutional.”187  
The inference is misplaced. First, the fact that a President decides to determine 
the constitutionality of a law before signing it does not imply that he thinks the 
question of constitutionality necessarily trumps all other considerations. He might 
simply feel duty-bound to make an informed decision and consider all relevant 
factors before signing, without intending to treat one of those factors as overriding. 
Indeed, Washington had earlier said that he “walk[ed] on untrodden ground”188 and 
that because he expected his actions “to establish a Precedent, it is devoutly wished 
on my part, that these precedents may be fixed on true principles.”189 So it is no 
surprise that, at a minimum, he would act deliberately. 
More importantly, as with the Cumberland Road, the constitutional objection to 
the bank bill was that Congress lacked the power to create the corporation at all;190 
if valid, that objection made the bill unredeemable. 
All of these examples confirm that Presidents sometimes must veto particular 
bills, and they are also consistent with the modern theory that there is no 
categorical duty to veto. The historical examples rarely speak to the modern issue, 
perhaps because it did not come up much.191 The President’s affirmative 
obligations to sign bills have increased dramatically with the passage of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and “[s]ubstantive riders on appropriations 
bills and other devices to evade the President’s veto power are more popular than 
ever.”192 
An examination of political practice cannot always distinguish between subtly 
different interpretations of the Constitution.193 Here, the practice is enough to 
strongly suggest that there was some class of unconstitutional bills that had to be 
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vetoed, but those scattered examples alone may not be enough to tell us what that 
class is. 
D. Constitutional Consequentialism 
It is probably impossible to lay out a completely determinate test for how the 
President should weigh these factors in deciding whether to sign a partly 
unconstitutional bill; and after all, the decision is ultimately committed to his 
constitutional judgment. But it is still possible to outline the most important 
considerations. 
Such a bill must also be at least partly constitutional before the President can 
sign it. If the bill is unconstitutional in every application of every part, then there is 
nothing redeeming about it.194 The President’s oath does not permit him to sign a 
bill because he likes the unconstitutional parts and plans to help them take effect. It 
must be that he has reason to pass the other parts of the bill, and cannot help that 
they come bundled to unconstitutional parts. 
Such a bill must be not only partly constitutional but partly required. While the 
act of signing an unconstitutional bill does not itself violate the Constitution, it does 
create a risk that the newly-signed parts will later be (improperly) enforced. There 
must be countervailing constitutional considerations—not merely non-
constitutional policy concerns—to justify taking that risk. 
The President must of course consider the size of the risk. A bill that has 
unconstitutional provisions that are quite likely to be enforced is much harder to 
justify than a bill whose unconstitutional application is extremely unlikely. 
Similarly, the President must consider the magnitude and importance of the 
possible violations, although it does not necessarily follow that he must follow a 
strict mathematical rule in comparing them. 
In weighing these factors, the analysis must be dynamic, not static. Congress 
and the President are repeat players, so by vetoing an unconstitutional bill the 
President may be able to get Congress to repass the bill without the impermissible 
portions, or to back down more frequently in the future.195 Or in other cases, 
excessive vetoes might cost him much of his constitutional credibility with 
Congress.196 The point is that the risks must be analyzed over the long run. 
(Some readers will notice a factor that is not listed: A few authors have 
suggested that it is somehow better if the President does not actually sign an 
unconstitutional bill but rather permits it to become law without a signature under 
the default provisions of Article I, Section 7.197 But under the logic of my 
argument, it does not matter whether the President tries to keep his hands clean in 
this fashion. If an unconstitutional law is nonetheless justifiable, the President has 
nothing to be ashamed of, and may as well sign it. If an unconstitutional law does 
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not have constitutional benefits that outweigh its constitutional risks, the President 
has no right to be passive.) 
To be sure, several of the foregoing factors provide standards, not rules, and 
admit a great deal of discretion. They are consequently hard to enforce: Judges 
might strike down a statute that is unconstitutional, but they will not order the 
President to veto one, and the people themselves (to whatever extent they care) 
would have a hard time supervising the application of such a malleable test. But 
legal frameworks can be important even when they do not come with regimes of 
adjudication or punishment. The President can take the Constitution seriously in 
executing his office (and historically he has).  
One other potential complaint about the malleability of these factors is that in 
practice the President will naturally interpret them to simply replicate his 
nonconstitutional policy preferences. As Fred Schauer has argued, “it is hardly 
clear, except as opportunistic political rhetoric, that we really expect our political 
leaders to follow the law when following the law conflicts with simply doing the 
right thing.”198 But even if this is so, a final important factor is not so malleable: 
Regardless of how the President decides which unconstitutional bills to sign, he 
must also do what he can to mitigate the risks he creates. That is, a President who 
signs an unconstitutional bill is not allowed to simply enforce it like any other. He 
has an array of tools to ensure that unconstitutional laws do not get enforced, and 
he is supposed to use them. There may well be circumstances in which the 
President is justified in deferring to the constitutional judgments of other branches 
out of institutional concerns. Maybe he does not always have to pardon every 
prisoner whose original conviction was constitutionally flawed.199 Maybe he is 
sometimes justified in permitting or instructing the Solicitor General to put forward 
lawyers’ arguments in defense of unconstitutional statutes.200 But when the 
President signs an unconstitutional law, he must be particularly punctilious about 
mitigating the danger he has created. The President need not use his veto when he 
has other, better tools for fulfilling his oath. But if he does not use those either, it 
suggests that he just does not care that much about the Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Just last spring, Justice Scalia warned us against interpreting the Constitution to 
perfectly supply everything we need from it: “[t]he Constitution . . . is not an all-
purpose tool for judicial construction of a perfect world . . . .”201 We must be just as 
wary of the reverse—assuming that yesterday’s formalisms are inadequate for 
today’s government.  
The stakes are real. Those who think that there is a categorical duty to veto 
unconstitutional bills think that President Nixon should have vetoed the Voting 
Rights Act of 1970, and that future Presidents must veto important war measures if 
they contain an unenforceable and therefore unimportant legislative veto.  
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Fortunately, the Constitution does not create such a trap. While the President is 
obligated to review the constitutionality of bills that are presented to him, and 
sometimes to veto them, the Constitution does not present a categorical rule. In a 
particular class of important cases—such as where national security or civil rights 
are at stake—the President better fulfills his oath to the Constitution by signing 
unconstitutional laws. 
There is also a broader lesson about what we remember and what we forget. We 
are all too eager to remember the long list of things the President must not do. We 
more easily forget that there are many things that he must do. Our Constitution does 
not create a passive President, and we should not make him into one. 
  
